COMMENT
THE ROLE OF ADVICE AND CONSENT:
SENATORIAL DISCOURTESY
INTRODUCTION

Under the New Jersey Constitution of 1947 the justices of the
supreme court, superior court, county courts and all inferior courts
with jurisdiction extending to more than one municipalilty, are appointed by the Governor with the "advice and consent" of the Senate.' The presently accepted interpretation of this clause allows each
senator, if displeased with a particular judicial nomination from within
his county, to object to that nomination. The result is inaction by
the entire Senate on the particular individual and possibly other
nominees from that county, without consideration of personal qualifi3
cations. 2 This "unwritten rule" is known as "Senatorial Courtesy."
The advice and consent power is not confined to just judicial
confirmations; it can be located in several other clauses in the New
Jersey Constitution. 4 These various clauses give the Governor of
New Jersey an extremely broad appointment power. 5 "[Tihe senatorial balancing power of advise and consent, while not co-extensive, is
likewise one of the broadest in the nation." 6 This is due to the wide
range of positions which are subject to Senate confirmation, ranging
from the appointment of justices of the supreme court and agency
commissioners to judges and magistrates of the police court. 7 Thus,
the utilization of Senatorial Courtesy gains increased importance. 8
As in any other other area of discretion, the potential for abuse is
great. The availability of the courtesy power in the judicial appointment process results in the encroachment of partisan politics upon
the judiciary. Furthermore, when the courtesy is exercised, large
backlogs of cases develop due to unfilled vacancies. In recent years, a
major cause of dissatisfaction with the state judicial system has been
the imposition of Senate influence upon the executive's appointment
I N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 6, para. 1.
2 Wiley, Senatorial Courtesy, 97 N.J.L.J. 65, 71 (1974).

3 Id. at 65.

4 Id.
5 Id.
6 id.

IId.; N.J. CONST. art. 5, § 3, para. 2; N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 6, para. 1; N.J. CONST. art. 7,
§ 2, para. 1.
s Wiley, supra note 2, at 65.
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powers. 9 By employing the courtesy device, a single senator has the
ability to halt the appointment mechanism simply by objecting to the
inclusion or exclusion of a certain nominee. For example, the courtesy device was used in 1976 to block nine concurrent appointments
due to a dispute over a single nomination. 10 During the 1974-1975
legislative session, at least eighty-one nominations were blocked
either temporarily or permanently by the objections of different
senators. 1
In 1976, an in depth study of this practice by the State Bar Association Committee on Senatorial Courtesy recommended in a highly
critical report that suits be commenced to challenge the use of
Senatorial Courtesy. 12 One suit was recently started in Bergen
County. As a result of the numerous assertions of Senatorial Courtesy, Bergen County was facing an extremely large backlog of cases
due to several judicial vacancies. 13 The Bergen County Bar Association had filed suit in an attempt to ensure "an adequate judiciary." 14
The suit, which was eventually dropped,' 5 was an action brought in
the name of the bar association and its president, 16 and named the
President of the Senate and all of the senators severally and individually as defendants. 17 Since the courtesy power could not be invoked
without the consent of all the senators, the bar association felt that no
one senator should be singled out in the suit.'
One of the main reasons for the suit was the bar association's
belief that the motives behind the invocation of Senatorial Courtesy
were improper.1 9 Many individuals have taken the position that the
courtesy power has been abused by senators who are intent upon
9 Seiler, Judicial Selection in New Jersey, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 721, 748-49 (1974).
lO Newark Star Ledger, Oct. 8, 1976, at 21, col. 1.
11 Id., May 21, 1976, at 7, col. 5.

12 Report of the State Bar Association Senatorial Courtesy Commission, 2 ADVOCATE 1, 12
(1976). The non-partisan special commission, chaired by retired state supreme court Justice
Nathan J. Jacobs, and Monsignor Thomas G. Fahy, recommended a court challenge to test
Senatorial Courtesy. Id.

The Commission termed Senatorial Courtesy an "anachronism" and

called for an end to the practice. Id. The Commission concluded that "[tihe fight against crime
may have been hampered in some places in our state by the intrusion of partisan considerations." Id. The Commission further recommended that the appointment process bypass "the
political clubhouse" and make judicial selection solely on merit. Id.
'3 Newark Star Ledger, Sept. 25, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
14 Id.
'5 Newark Star Ledger, Dec. 6, 1978, at 29, col. 1.
N6Complaint, Chase v. Merlino, No. 17, 605-78, at I (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as Complaint].
17 Id.

Newark Star Ledger, Sept. 25, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
19 Complaint, supra note 16, at 8. The Complaint stated that "[t]he use of the custom of
'Senatorial Courtesy' in the manner aforesaid was arbitrary, capricious and had no relationship
58
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placing their own people on the bench. 20 In addition, the fact that
the motives behind the blocking of nominations have been traditionally cloaked in secrecy 2 l has only succeeded in creating greater suspicion about the blocking device. The avowed purpose of the suit,
22
however, was the abolition of Senatorial Courtesy.
The bar association suit did, of course, face the same obstacles
previously encountered by similar past suits, i.e., justiciability, political question, standing, and the difficulty of implementing relief.23 If
a solution is to be found, the litigants must first find an avenue
through which they can gain access to the courts. Yet, the judicial
remedies should not be viewed as exclusive. Other solutions do exist;
reform can be accomplished along other routes. In some of these
24
areas, a movement for reform has been in existence for years.
This Comment will explore the specific problems with respect to
the use of Senatorial Courtesy, as presented in earlier litigation and
controversies. 2 5 In the process of such an analysis, emphasis will be
given to the evolution of the "advice and consent" clause during the
two state constitutional conventions. 26 In addition, this Comment
will suggest specific judicial2 7 and legislative 28 solutions to the varito the qualifications or integrity of the nominees or any one of them and was illegal and unconstitutional." Id. Further "[t]he custon [sic] of 'Senatorial Courtesy' has no reasonable relationship to the powers granted the Senate of New Jersey to 'advise and consent' as set forth in
article VI, section VI, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution." Id.
20 Wiley, supra note 2, at 65.
21 See id.
22 Complaint, supra note 16, at 8. The Complaint reads in part:
The failure and refusal of the defendants, the President and Members of the
Senate of New Jersey, to discharge their constutitionally mandated obligations as
aforesaid and their participation in a so-called "deadlock" with respect to the accomplishment of judicial appointments for judicial offices in Bergen County constituted and continues to constitute an unconstitutional exercise by the legislative
branch of powers not residing in that branch and an unconstitutional infringement
upon the power and authority of the judicial branch . ..of the government of New
Jersey ....
Id. at 5-6.
23 Passaic County Bar Ass'n v. Hughes, 108 N.J. Super. 161, 260 A.2d 261 (Ch. Div. 1969);
Kligerman v. Lynch, 92 N.J. Super. 373, 223 A.2d 511 (Ch. Div.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 822
(1966).
24 See note 102 infra and accompanying text.
25 See notes 131-70 infra and accompanying text.
26 For discussion of the Constitutional Convention of 1844, see notes 62-89 infra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Constitutional Convention of 1947, see notes 90-101
infra and accompanying text.
27 For a discussion of the proposed judicial changes, see notes 179-219 infra and accompanying text.
28 For a discussion of the proposed legislative changes, see notes 220-29 infra and accompanying text.
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ous problems inherent in the exercise of this power. Finally, other
potential remedies which might provide a solution will be dealt with
29
in some detail.
COLONIAL HISTORY OF ADVICE AND CONSENT

Following New Hampshire and South Carolina, New Jersey was
the third colony to draw up a constitution. 30 Since it was drafted
quickly, it lacked, for the most part, the sophistication and detail of
the later constitutions. 3 1 Furthermore, the document was probably
authored by a single writer. 32 The close proximity of British forces
may have had an influence on the final document as approved by the
Provincial Congress. 3 3 Modeled after the colonial government, the
new state government consisted of a Governor, Legislative Council
and General Assembly. 34 A suspicion of the power of the executive,
combined with the Assembly's vital role in the revolutionary cause,
resulted in the elevation of legislative power. 35 The theory of separa29 For a discussion of other possible changes, see notes 123-,30 infra and accompanying text.
30 R. CONNORS, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1776, at 8 (1976) [hereinafter cited as R. CONNORS]. The drafting of a constitution was considered to be just one of the tasks which the
provincial Congress had to perform at the time. The document was drawn up very quickly and
did not rely upon any of the earlier state constitutions as models. PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1844, J. Bebout introduction at xvi (New

Jersey writers' Project ed. 1942) [hereinafter cited as J. BEBOUT].
31 R. CONNORS, 1776 CONSTITUTION, supra note 30, at 8. The document contained no bill
of rights and was not submitted to the people for their approval. See id.
32 J. BEBOUT, supra note 30, at xvi. In 1776, in response to requests by the Constitutionmaking bodies of New Jersey and North Carolina, John Adams wrote a letter specifying his
views and requirements for a state constitution. In New Jersey, the individual who received the
letter was Jonathan Dickson Sergeant, a "friend and correspondent of Adams." Sergeant is credited "with the principal authorship of our state Constitution." Id. at xxii. For the text of the
Adams letter, see IV THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 202 (C. Francis ed. 1852).
33 C. ERD.mAN, THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION OF 1776, at 44 (1929). From 1776 to 1781
New Jersey was continually under the threat of British invasion. J. POMFRET, COLONIAL NEW
JERSEY: A HISTORY 274-96 (1973).

34 J. BEBOUT, supra note 30, at xvii.
35 Id. All state and county officers including the governor "were chosen by the legislature
in joint meeting." C. ERDMAN, supra note 33, at 61. The lack of any "broad discretionary
Prerogative" of the executive can be traced to the abuses of George III during the colonial
period. This made such power on the part of the executive "unacceptable to the men of the
revolution." Id. at 44-63 Charles Erdman wrote:
But in June of 1776 the evils to be avoided were those springing from an independent executive, or so the [c]olonists of New Jersey imagined; and accordingly, believing in, and trusting, a popularly elected body, they were willing to assign to it
practical control of all the branches of government.
Id. at 69. The system of government which existed in colonial New Jersey lent much to the
manner in which powers were distributed to the different branches under the constitution. J.
BEBOUT, supra note 30, at xv. The Governor was intended to be the center of the royal gov-
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tion of powers, as a basis for a democratic government, was ig36
nored.
A significant change under this constitution involved the selection and tenure of state officials. 37 All judicial appointments had
been previously made by the Governor subject to the scrutiny of the
crown. 38 Under the wording of the first constitution, the appointing
power was vested in the Legislative Council and the Assembly. 39
Since the Council comprised only a quarter of the joint meeting in
which all judicial appointments were made, little equality existed be40
tween the houses in the implementation of the appointing process.
Not only were the judicial appointments made by joint meeting,
they were for certain specified terms. The judges were subject to
41
removal by impeachment in the Assembly or trial by the Council.
The salaries of the judges were prone to increase, decrease, or repeal
42
at the will of the legislature.

ernment. A struggle resulted between the Governor, who was considered to represent the
"imperial interest," and the legislature which was thought of as representing the people. Out of
this conflict there developed a line of thought among the members of the Assembly and its
supporters of "establishing and fixing certain principles for the government." Id. The principles
to be established would naturally be weighed in favor of the legislature, in particular "the lower
or popular branch of the legislature." Id. This situation, when combined with the circumstances
under which the constitution of 1776 was written, led to a legislative dominance in the new
government.
36

Id.

37 R. CONNORS, supra note 30, at 19.
38 Id.
The actions of the Governor, as well as the legislature, were meant to conform as
closely as possible to the laws and statutes of the crown. In particular, the appointing power was
subject to the desires of the crown. See J. BEBOUT, supra note 30, at xiv. After the new
constitution, the Governor became an elected official chosen by both houses of the legislature in
a joint meeting. R. CONNORS, supra note 30, at 10. The Governor continued to function as a
member of the legislature. His position as the presiding officer in the upper house, enabled him
to cast a deciding vote in the event of a tie vote. Id. In addition, the Governor had no veto
power and little in the way of "clearly defined executive functions." J. POMFRET, supra note 33,
at 263.
39 R. CONNORS, supra note 30, at 12. There were only three areas beyond the scope of
legislative power: "the right of trial by jury, religious freedom as then defined, and the provision for annual elections." J. POMFRET, supra note 33, at 263. Other than this, there was no
practical limitation on "the lawmaking powers of the General Assembly." Id. The appointment
power of the Assembly completely terminated the power of appointment on the part of the
Governor. Id.
40 R. CONNORS, supra note 30, at 12.
"1 C. ERDMAN, supra note 33, at 66. Article XII reads "Supreme Court Judges for seven
years, Judges of the inferior courts, Justices of the Peace and Clerks of the Courts for five
years." 1776 N.J. CONST. art. XII.
42 C. ERDMAN, supra note 33, at 66. Governor Livingston, under the nor de plume of
"Scipio", argued that the salaries of the judges should run as long as their commissions and not
be subject to a decrease during that time. Id. n.150, quoting New Jersey Gazette (Trenton)
June 14, 1784.
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One of the predominant criticisms of the constitution of 1776 was
the dependence of the judiciary upon the legislature, rather than
upon the executive. 4 3 The latter situation had been the rule in New
Jersey since 1761, when King George II ordered that the tenure of
judicial positions should be during the "royal pleasure rather than
good behavior." 4 4 The evils most often bred by this system of government were the "incompetence and subservience of the courts; . ..
[and] the corruption and dissipation of the legislative power because
of preoccupation of legislators with judicial and administrative patronage." 45 Also, the lack of any constitutional limitation on the number
of judges led to abuse of the legislative appointing power. 46 In every
session of the legislature its members would time and again make
requests of patronage in their own respective counties. This could
only result in a largely inept and untrained judiciary. 47 In addition,

43 C. ERDMAN, supra note 33, at 66. The constitution made no mention of the judiciary
other than establishing the court of appeals. Id. Apparently, the members of the convention
were predominantly concerned with political affairs and assumed the courts would remain as
they existed in colonial New Jersey. W. CLEVENGER & E. KEASBEY, THE COURTS OF NEW
JERSEY 122 (1903).
" C. ERDMAN, supra note 33, at 66. In the royal province, the highest court of appeals was

made up of the governor and the council. The governor with the consent of the Council established the other courts. J. BEBOUT, supra note 30, at I-Ii. For a discussion of the provincial
courts, see R. FIELD, THE PROVINCIAL COURTS OF NEW JERSEY (1949). What became the

traditional theory of separation of powers developed with the experiences of the different state
constitutions between 1776 and 1787. J. BEBOUT, supra at xxvii. In New Jersey, the restrictions
against plurality in office under article XX of the state constitution of 1776 was not meant to
apply to the council. When council members were appointed to judicial positions they continued to serve in their legislative posts. Alternatively, when judges or those holding judicial
posts were elected to the council they continued to hold their judicial positions. C. ERDMAN,
supra note 33, at 68. In 1786, William Livingston, the first governor of New Jersey, wrote:
I have seen Justices of the Peace who were a burlesque upon a magistracy, justices
illiterate, justices partial, justices groggy, justices courting popularity to be chosen
assemblymen, . . . But I have not seen any joint meeting sufficiently cautious
against appointment such justices of the peace.
H.

CLOKIE, NEW JERSEY AND THE CONFEDERATION:

NEW JERSEY,

A HISTORY 555 (1959).

In

1776, William Paterson, a Councillor from Somerset County, upon being elected Attorney General kept his council seat. On the first legislative council under the new constitution, six of its
thirteen members held "other judicial offices or posts of profit under the government having
been appointed to them by the legislature of which they continued to be members." Id. n. 162.
45 J. BEBOUT, supra note 30, at li.
46 W. GRIFFITH, EUMENES 149 (1799). "In fact disparagement of the judges of the inferior
courts was chronic." J. BEBOUT, supra note 30, at lii. Bebout noted that in 1837 the Trenton

State Gazette reported that due to disagreement between the houses of the legislature over
certain judicial appointments, the joint meeting was not being held. Id.
" W. GRIFFITH, supra note 46, at 138-39. There were criticisms of the high courts of the
state as well as on the county level. Griffith wrote that the characteristics found wanting in the
high courts of the state were "Independence, Ability and Official Industry." Id. at 81. An editorial which appeared in the New York Spectator in 1799 spoke very critically of the state of the
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there were reports of "disagreement between the two houses" of the
48
legislature which resulted in delays of the appointing process.
In the period following the acceptance of the constitution, there
was "an increasing emphasis on independence and vigor in the executive." 4 9 This development was limited, however, by the "requirement that the governor act with the consent of the council." 50 This
limitation mirrored the fear which existed of "'those badges of slavery
called prerogatives' so long associated with the chief of state." 5 '
With the federal constitutional convention of 1787 there came a
great wave of dissatisfaction with the state constitution of 1776. The
basis of this dissatisfaction was the absence of any separation of powers in the government. 5 2 By this time, the leading political theorists
had come to the conclusion "that in order to make the separation of
powers effective the executive must be strengthened." 5 3 James
Madison had concluded that the appointing power should rightly be
"inits nature an executive function." 5 4 The basis behind this assertion was the belief that the powers of the executive should have been
those which would effectuate the legislative provisions. These powers
must necessarily include the appointment of such officers as are

judicial system in New Jersey:
"'There is not now in New-Jersey, one single tribunal entrusted with the decision of legal controversies, which can be said to possess the qualifications of constitutional independence and impartiality: they all of them are shackled by party, or
influenced by dependence; and the measure of justice is not the law of the land,
but some other measure, which is better calculated to keep the judge in commission, or promote the objects of his party. ...
'"
J. BEBOUT, supra note 30, at liii (quoting The New York Spectator, Apr. 13, 1799).
48 J.BEBOUT, supra note 30, at lii, citing the Trenton State Gazette, Mar. 24, 1837.
49 J. BEBOUT, supra note 30, at xxiv.

50 Id. The principle behind the "advice and consent" clause existed under the constitution
of 1776 and the provincial period prior to 1776.
51 Id. Bebout is quoting from John Adams' discussions of separation of powers. For a discussion of the political theory which dominated constitutional thinking during the revolutionary
era, see C. ERDMAN, supra note 33, at 263.
52 W. GRIFFITH, supra note 46, at 12.
53 J. BEBOUT, supra note 30, at xxviii. Madison stated in THE FEDERALIST No. 47 that
"[t]he accumulation of powers, legislative, executive and judiciary, in the same hands, whether
of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison). Alexander
Hamilton wrote that: "Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good
government . . . . A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble
execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it
may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government." THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (A.

Hamilton).
54 THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison). Jefferson argued that the appointment power
should be given to the executive. P. FORD, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 40 (1914).
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needed to "expound the laws, which constitutes the judicial power
55
under the executive."
It was, perhaps, this awareness of the need to reconstruct its
own state government which made New Jersey wholly supportive of
the revision of the Articles of Confederation. 5 6 From this point until
the state constitutional convention in 1844, the "agitation for revision
of the state's Revolutionary constitution was, if not chronic, at least
periodic." 5 7 The principle difficulty with the movement for revision
was convincing the population at large that the "theoretic errors"
were causing enough "actual evils" to justify the hazards of such a
change. 58 A compromise bill was passed to allow a popular referendum on the calling of a constitutional convention in 1800. The referendum question, however, became mixed with the issues being debated in the presidential election of that year and subsequently was
voted down. 5 9 There were further attempts to revise the constitution
in 181960 and 1827, 61 both failing. It was not until 1844 that the
revisionist movement achieved its goal.
THE CONSTITUTION OF

1844:

THE FEDERAL INFLUENCE

There was still strong support for the joint meeting mode of judicial appointment at the convention of 1844. Much of this support
stemmed from the fear of the potential abuse of power which might
arise from executive control of judicial nominations.6 2 Therefore, repugnance to the omnipotence of a monarch was fired anew at the
55 W. GRIFFITH, supra note 46, at 116-17.
56 R. MCCORMICK, EXPERIMENT IN INDEPENDENCE

25 (1950). "New Jersey having taken

the lead in indicating the road to constitutional revision, was the first state to appoint delegates
to the projected Philadelphia Convention." Id. at 255 n.10.
57 J. BEBOUT, supra note 30, at xix; see W. GRIFFITH, supra note 46, at 119.
58 See J. BEBOUT, supra note 30, at xix.
59 Id. at xxxvii.
60 Id. The revisionists attempted to establish the right of the legislature to submit an
amendment to the populace, there being no provision for amendment in the constitution of
1776. Id.
61 Id. at xxxviii. At this point an "unofficial" convention of "prominent" men from several
colonies gathered in Trenton to produce a document stating the defects in the constitution. Id.
The document further contained a request directed to the legislature to call a constitutional
convention. The document was referred into legislative committee from which it never
emerged. Id.
62 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1844, at

348-49 (N.J. Writers' Project ed. 1942) [hereinafter cited as

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1844 CON(remarks of delegate William Ewing of Cumberland County). Mr. Ewing stated that:
"The Governor w[ould] only nominate his own political friends and his nominations w[ould] be
disregarded by the Senate and the offices w[ould] not be filled and the people w[ould] suffer
great inconvenience." Id. at 349. Mr. Ewing believed that such a system of appointment was
VENTION]
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thought of "vesting the power of nomination to office in any one
man." 63
It was argued by those in support of appointment by a joint
committee that partisan politics would have the same aggregate effect
on the executive as it did upon the legislature. 64 It was also asserted
that the judicial appointments, particularly those to the supreme
court, made by the joint committee had been "acceptable and in accordance with the wishes of the people, . . . honorable to the State
in every point of view." 65 Furthermore, the proponents of the joint
outdated and not in keeping with the times. Earlier in the convention he stated that:
The appointment by a Governor and Council was a retrograde movement,
worthy to have emanated from His Majisty the King when he had the dominion of
the province. It was a remnant of barbarous, times inconsistent with the liberal
feelings and enlightened intelligence of the age in which we live.
Id. at 274. Sister states in which this system was already in effect were noted by members of
the convention as examples of the abuse. Id. at 349. Reference was made to the situation in
New York. Mr. Ewing questioned:
Are not, all the appointments controlled by a clique-by a few men who have all
the power in their own hands?-lt may happen too, that these ten men may all be
from a particular part of the State.
Id. (emphasis in original). In discussions concerning the appointment process in other states,
emphasis was placed upon the quality of the high judicial officers being nominated and appointed to office. id. at 486 (remarks of delegate Henry Green of Mercer County). In response
to these remarks, one delegate commented:

The Governor of Penn[sylvanial has abused the appointing power because there has
been no check on him. I am unwilling, sir, to give this power to the Governor
without a check, and thus the Senate has been added. It is a wise and salutary
provision.
Id. at 492 (remarks of delegate R. Field of Mercer County).
63 Id. at 484. Much was said at the convention about those individuals who partook in the
formation of the constitution of 1776. Those in opposition to amending the appointing power as
structured in that constitution considered it an affront to these men of the revolution to carrn
forth such an amendment. One delegate, Mr. William Ewing, believed that:
When the founders of our constitution assembled at that critical period to perform
the duty they had the experience of a method of appointment like that proposed in
the report . ..and their object was to guard against the future exercise of this
arbitrary and dangerous power, and they gave the power of appointment, most
judiciously, to the Joint meeting.
Id. at 348-49.
" Id. at 487 (remarks of delegate H. Green of Mercer County). Mr. Green argued a strong
defense for the joint meeting on this topic.
Talk of caucus, sir. Look abroad and tell me whether any nominations have been
made by any executive more free and independent than have been made on this
floor. I admit that place the power where you will, there will be difficulty, but I do
say and I say it without fear of contradiction on any good ground, that it exists in
greater force in the secret nominations of the Governor.
* ..Is there an instance within a quarter of a century in the history of the
United States where an individual has been appointed to the bench of the Supreme
Court of the U.S. who was not a sworn, tried friend of the Executive?
Id.
65 Id. at 487.
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meeting appointive process declared that none of the high judges in
the state had been placed in their positions as a result of "bargain or
66
corruption."
The proposed change which would split the appointing power
between the Governor and the Senate was considered by some delegates to be too radical an "innovation." 6 7 These delegates believed
that such a change would put judicial selection in the hands of the
8
Governor alone.6.
Several delegates at the 1844 convention focused upon the appointive process in the federal system. The Federal Constitution provided that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the Supreme
Court .... ."69 The delegates highlighted the dispute between the
Senate and the President which had led to judicial nominations being
rejected or suspended. 70 Positions of the "greatest importance" such
as justices of the United States Supreme Court allegedly were effected by the "mischief" which grew out of such a system of judicial
appointment.71 The significance of this argument was the reference

66

Id. at 486. Delegate Green stressed that there could be no more obvious a fact but that

the "assembled wisdom" of the legislature would be more competent in judicial selection than
one man "coming from Cape May or some remote comer of the State." id. What could one
such individual know of the "qualifications of these offices?" Id.
67 Id. at 352-53 (remarks of delegate Mahon Dickerson of Morris County). Delegate Dickerson inquired whether the state was ready for such an innovation. He concluded that the people
of New Jersey would not consent to such a change. "There is nothing they expect more anxiously than that we should preserve all the features of the old constitution, that we can." Id.
Indicating that the fault with the then appointing process was not the system itself, Mr. Dickerson explained that "[tihe old system has worked well. There is a responsibility. The names of
members are called for the yeas and nays. If the members do not regard their responsibility, it
is the fault of the people who elect such men." Id. at 352.
It is conceded that imperfections exist in all human institutions of government. Id. at 355.
The question is where the power of appointment can be placed which will make it most secure.
This security would most surely be found in the Governor. Id. The vote for the amendment for
the changing of the appointment procedure was not an overwhelming majority. There remained
a strong minority in favor of the joint meeting process. See id. at 496-510.
98 Id. at 352.
69 U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2.
70 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1844 CONVENTION, supra note 62, at 353. For example, Delegate
Dickerson commented: "I will not say whether the President or Senate is wrong, but the system is wrong, and much mischief grows out of it." Id. The inference to be drawn from these
discussions is that there was an implied recognition by the 1844 convention delegates that a
courtesy rule would be a concomitant aspect of the proposed judicial selection process. The
delegates in support of such a change were willing, however, to accept this in order to cure
greater evils within the judicial appointment process. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
71

Id.
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to incidents of Senatorial Courtesy on the federal level, which the
opponents to the proposed change felt would arise in New Jersey.72
In addition, opposition to innovation was also based upon the
supposed effectiveness of the joint meeting as an appointive body.73
Since judicial independence would not be maintained unless the
judiciary functioned above all fear, the subjection of judicial offices to
the will of the executive would cause compromises by aspirants to
judgeships, in light of possible "collision with the Executive, or his
74
friends, or family, or his political adherents."
Those in support of reform contended, however, that the power
of appointment was an executive power by right. Arguably, this right
stemmed from the duty of the executive to see that the laws are
faithfully executed and hence the appointment of persons to office by
whom they are to be executed is a branch of executive power. 75 The
Governor, being the only true representative of the people of the
state, was the most responsible individual to receive the power to
nominate judicial officers. 76 It was believed that the Governor, as a
single individual "having a physical and legal existence," 7 7 could be

72 For a discussion of the federal experience, see J. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF
THE SENATE (1953).
73 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1844 CONVENTION,

supra note 62, at 488. Delegate Green of

Mercer County noted that "unless a good reason is shewn for the change, it ought not to be
made." Id. Delegate Green further argued that:
I care not what may be the practice in other states, or in the United States. The
vesting of this appointing power of the highest judicial offices in New Jersey in this
wise, will not only be a novelty, but a very unpalatable one to the people.
Id.
74 Id. (remarks by delegate H. Green of Mercer County).
75 Id. at 353 (remarks by delegate A. Browning of Camden County). There was a major
concern by delegate Browning and others that to "blend or consolidate" the "respective duties"
of the different branches would unite them and "destroy their purity and independence." Id. at
353-54. This was being done by the consolidation of the appointing power in the legislature
whose duty is was to "create the laws," not execute them. Id. at 353-54; see id. at 376.
Delegate Field argued that "there is more responsibility when the Governor makes the
appointments, than when the Legislature do[es] .... The Governor is solely responsible. But
when the power is exercised by a select body of men, no one is responsible." Id. at 357 (remarks of delegate R. Field of Mercer County) (emphasis in original). The foundation behind this
argument is that the Governor would take heed from the fact that he was individually responsible and would act accordingly when exercising his appointive powers. Delegate Field further
believed in "giving the appointing power to the Governor because it is an Executive powerthe great Executive power." Id. (emphasis in original).
76 Id. at 354 (remarks of delegate A. Browning of Camden County).
77 Id. The proponents of reform concluded that the people of New Jersey wanted a specific
person to whom they could direct grievances with regard to the quality of judicial performance.
Since the Governor was more directly responsible to the people, they would be able to yield
the most effective influence on judicial selection through the Governor.
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held directly responsible to the people. The joint meeting, on the
other hand, had neither of these characteristics and was "responsible
to nobody or nothing." 78 The basis of this comparison was that the
quality of judicial appointments would be more closely scrutinized
due to the Governor's direct responsibility to the people.
It was also argued that the people of New Jersey were no longer
willing to accept the vesting of the appointive power in the legislature. 79 These proponents of reform concluded that the people of
New Jersey wanted a specific person to whom they could direct grievances, regarding the quality of judicial performance. Since the Governor was more directly responsible to the people, they would be
able to yield the most effective influence on judicial selection through
the Governor. In response to efforts by their opponents to put the
proposed change in disrepute by reference to problems and abuses on
the federal level, it was noted that many fine judges had been appointed by the President since 1789.80
To insure that the individuals chosen to fill the various judicial
positions were of good character and were competent for the position,
the Senate could maintain a check on the executive. In this way, the
balance of powers between the executive and the Senate would secure the continuing independence of the judicial branch. The responsibility of the Governor to the people of the state would serve to
dilute the potential for partisan influence on his nominations.8 1
Although much debate had ensued regarding the subjection of
the Governor to demoralizing and corrupting influences, 8 2 the consensus of the members of the convention was that the improvement
over the joint meeting mode of appointment was too great to ignore.8 3 Thus, when the appointment power was formalized in the

78 Id. (remarks of delegate A. Browning of Camden County). Delegate Field noted:

Look sir, at our Judges of the Supreme Court,-look at our representatives in
foreign countries. Look at the men who have been placed at the heads of various

departments .... and say if they do not present a long line of illustrious patriots
who have graced the annals of our country's fame, & who are entitled to the
gratitude and reward of their country.
Id. at 491-92 (R.Field); See J. HARsus, supra note 72, at 215.
" Id. at 374 (remarks of delegate R. Kennedy of Warren County). Delegate Kennedy rose in

fervent attack on the ability of partisan politics to influence the appointment process. He welcomed the removal of this power from the legislature "to put an end to the intrigues of caucus."
Id. Partisanship in the section of judicial offices and the overbearing will of the majority so
prevalent in the joint meeting would be remedied. Id.
80 Id. at 491-92 (remarks of delegate R. Field of Mercer County).
81 Id. at 358.
82 Id. at 362.
83 Id. at 491.
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1844 constitution, the people of New Jersey were aware that: "Justices of the Supreme Court, Chancellors, judges of the Court of Errors and Appeals and judges of the Inferior Court of Common Pleas,
shall be nominated by the Governor, and appointed by him, with the
84
advice and consent of the Senate."
The concept of Senatorial Courtesy as practiced today was apparently not foreseen as a major obstacle by any of the delegates present at the 1844 convention. This was true even though Senatorial
Courtesy had been in practice on the federal level since 1789.85 Apparently, supporters of the reform were aware of and willing to concede that the new system of judicial appointment would be subject to
many of the same pressures which already existed on the federal
level. 86 Further, the delegates were probably aware of many of the
components which might lead to the implementation of Senatorial
Courtesy. However, the concept itself did not necessitate any extensive consideration. Passage of a few years would reveal the potential
for the use of the courtesy under the revised system, of judicial appointments. 8 7 The rule would soon become common practice within
the realms of judicial selection in New Jersey. Between 1844 and the
194 0's, it would enjoy a scattered use within the legislature, 88 and
eventually emerge as an effective device for individual senators to increase their positions of power in dealings with the governor. 89
THE CONSTITUTION OF

1947:

DISCUSSED BUT UNCHANGED

During the 1940's, there again arose intense pressure for constitutional revision within New Jersey. In 1941, a constitutional commission was created to deal with many of the problems which existed
under the 1844 constitution. 9" However, the commission met with
little success. 91 The legislature then became an active component in

84

1844 N.J. CONST. art. VII, § 2, para. 1.

'5
86
87
88
89
90

See J. HARRIS, supra note 72 at 215-37.

See id.
See id.

See id.
See notes 171-79 supra and accompanying text.
R. CONNORS, THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN NEW JERSEY: 1940-1947,

at 38-45 (1970) [hereinafter cited as R.

CONNORS, CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION]. The labours of
constitutional commission had minimal impact since the caucus sessions were held without public hearings or extensive press coverage. Id. The final draft of the constitution as proposed by
the commission would have effected no significant changes in judicial selection within the state.

See generally REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE REVISION OF THE NEW
TION (1942).
91 R. CONNORS, CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, supra note 90, at 38-45.
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the revision movement in 1943, when a bill was passed which authorized it to sit as a constitutional convention. The constitution
drafted by the legislature proved to be identical to that drawn up by
the 1941 commission. 92 The bitter campaign for revision in 1944 resulted in a rejection of the proposed constitution by the people of
New Jersey. 93 Proponents of revision eventually achieved success in
1947 with a constitutional convention composed of popularly elected
delegates. 94
Debate at the convention relating to the judicial appointive process
95
focused upon the effect of political pressures on the judiciary.
Although several proposals were put forth, they did not suggest drastic changes in the language of the appointing clause as contained in
the 1844 constitution. 96 These proposals were an attempt to dissipate the Governor's nomination power by the creation of bodies which
would supply the Governor with lists of individuals from which he
could choose his nominees. 97 Fear of the many evils that would arise

92 See [1943] MANUAL OF THE LEGISLATURE OF NEW JERSEY 78. This action was strongly

influenced by the statements of Governor Charles Edison in his annual message to the legislature in 1943. Governor Edison stated:
If we are honest with ourselves, we cannot expect that the haphazard, inefficient,
and irresponsible State government that we have under the constitution of 1844 will
be half-way competent to deal with the new problems it will have to face.
id. at 630-31.
93 [1944] MANUAL OF THE LEGISLATURE OF NEW JERSEY 78. The final vote was 789,956

no" and 663,435 "yes"-a margin of over 126,000 votes for those opposed to the draft. Id. The
general mode of selection, however, continued to reflect the need for a modernization of the
state constitution to rid it of those antiquities which existed in the 1844 Constitution. See R.
CONNORS, CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, supra note 90, at 109-16.
94 R. CONNORS, CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, supra note 90, at 117.

95 Id. at 157. The Committee on the Judiciary was chaired by Mr. Frank Sommer. The
vice-chairman was Mr. Nathan L. Jacobs. It would be Jacobs who would chair the committee
for most of the convention due to illness on the part of Mr. Sommer. Id. at 155. With regard to
judicial selection, the committee remained within the "framework of the existing document."
Id.
96 Id. at 157. None of the proposals suggested that the language "the advice and consent of
the Senate" as written in the 1844 constitution be struck or altered in any way. For the text of
the various proposals, see note 97 infra.
97 IV NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1947, at 570-600 [hereinafter cited as
COMiMI'rEE ON THE JUDICIARY RECORD]. The Committee for Constitutional Revision (Commit-

tee) submitted a proposal that provided for a "Judicial Council to assist the Governor in selecting judges." Id. at 578-79. Such a council would, in the Committee's opinion, remove "judicial
nominations from the close political control that now exists." Id. In pertinent part, the proposal
read:
At the present time the selection of a jurist is in the hands of two partisan branches
of the government, the legislative and the executive. We often hear complaints of
the political complexion of some of our courts. A Judicial Council consisting of not
more than nine members and representing the judiciary, the lay public and prob-
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if the legislature was vested with this power still existed in 1947 and,
therefore, no proposals for reverting back to the system in effect prior
98
to 1844 were put forward.
Discussion of Senatorial Courtesy at the convention arose within
the context of the partisan influences upon judicial appointments.9 9
It was felt that since the exercise of Senatorial Courtesy was so rare,
these proposed changes were unnecessary to counter partisan influence on judicial selection.10 0 Beyond exchanges such as this, Senatorial Courtesy was not widely discussed at the convention. Thus, the
specific language in the 1947 constitution, relating to judicial nomina-

tion, remained unchanged. It read:
The Governor shall nominate and appoint, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court, the Judges of the Superior Court, the Judges
of the County Courts and the judges of the inferior courts with
jurisdiction extending to more than one municipality.'

During and after the state convention of 1947, the principal concern of many legal scholars in New Jersey was not the mode of judicial selection, but rather reforms within the specific structure of the
newly organized court system. 10 2 Arthur T. Vanderbilt, the first
ably the organized bar would certainly include responsible and less partisan persons.
peculiarly well qualified to pass upon desirable judicial material.
Id. at 579. The New Jersey League of Women Voters Commission (League) submitted a similar
proposal which recommended that "a Commission on Judicial Appointments" be created to
submit a list of "qualified candidates for judicial office" to the Governor. Id. at 596. The appointment commission was to be composed of the Chief Justice, three members of the bar
selected by the state bar association, and three lay persons chosen by the Governor. Id.
The Committee on the Judiciary, however, feeling that such proposals might be too drastic,
chose to recommend the retention of the 1844 system of nomination by the Governor with the
advice and consent of the Senate. Id. at 747; see R. CONNORS, CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION,
supra note 90, at 157. By including other sources of input in the nomination process these
groups hoped to provide against the continued infusion of partisan politics into this area. There
was some concern by those opposed to allowing other groups to take part in the nomination of
judicial officers that such a system would create an imbalance between the Governor and the
legislature. See CONMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY RECORD, supra at 172, 502.
98 See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
99 See COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY RECORD, supra note 97, at 172-73.
100 Id. at 172 (remarks of Honorable Daniel J. Brennan).
101 N.J.CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 1.
102 See Vanderbilt, Judges and Jurors: Their Functions, Qualifications and Selection, 36
B.U.L. REV. 1, 43 (1956). Chief Justice Vanderbilt spoke with great vigor about the many
problems which would arise if New Jersey converted to an elective system. He maintained that
such a system would lessen "the independence of the judiciary by making politics a primary
element in their selection and continuance in office," id., since the voting population could not
"make a valid judgment" between those nominees for judicial office on the ballot. Id. In
Vanderbilt's view, judges would not be elected but rather would be selected by the "political
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Chief Justice of the new supreme court, considered the post-1947
system a very effective one, but indicated that the bar and general
public must be "alert and interested" in the selections being
made. 10 3 A deep concern remained over the "purely political appointment."104 It was to this evil that those in support of internal
reform directed themselves. Chief Justice Vanderbilt maintained that
there were three "essential" characteristics of a judicial figure.'
These were "impartiality, independence and immunity." 106 Of the
three, it was felt that impartiality would be the most important. Impartiality could be attained only through the independence and immunity of the judge. Thus, it is desirable that judges be free from
every attachment that could sway their ability to adjudicate in an impartial manner.' 0 7 Of course, no "method of selection" was totally
apolitical, however, no system would be more effective than judicial
nomination by the Governor where a "tradition of bipartisanship has
resulted in the elimination of the purely political appointment." 108

leaders." Id. See generally D. BERMAN, ELECTION VERSUS APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES 9-25,

37-160 (1926).
103 Vanderbilt, supra note 102, at 48. In 1952, New Jersey enacted N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:314 (West 1952) which read:

In every county in which there are or may be 2 or more judges of the county
court, all appointments to such judgeships shall be made in such manner that the
appointees shall be, as nearly as possible, in equal numbers, members of different
political parties, so as to constitute the county court in any such county bipartisan in
character.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:3-14 (West 1952).
104Vanderbilt, supra note 102, at 48. Chief Justice Vanderbilt saw a great need for bipartisan
judicial selection. This was the only way of assuring the public that one political party does not
control the courts and "that the Courts are not in politics." Id. at 49-50. In the Chief Justice's
opinion, the effectiveness of the judiciary was premised upon public confidence in the coinpetence and effectiveness of judges. Id.
105 Id. at 19.
106Id.

107Id. For a general appraisal of the performance and conduct of judges on the bench, see A.
VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 12-16 (1949); Stuffer, The

Work of the Judicial System 1950-1951, 6 RUTGERS L. REv. 1 (1951); Hartshorne, Progress in
New Jersey Judicial Administration, 3 RUTGERS L. REV. 161 (1949).
108 Vanderbilt, supra note 102, at 48-49. With regard to this seemingly insurmountable task
of divorcing politics from the judiciary, Vanderbilt wrote:
While the legal profession and the judges themselves have gradually realized
the need for the judiciary to divorce themselves from political matters, this has
proved to be difficult to attain. Although the role of partisan politics in the selection
of judges and in pressures on the judiciary is deplorable this does not mean that
prior political activities should disqualify a person for judicial office. In many ways
experience in politics and in other branches of government is most useful to widen
the horizons of a lawyer. But continued political activity by judges is another matter.
Id. at 50.
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An independent judiciary does not merely mean that individual
judges are free from "personal or private influence." 109 Rather, it
means a judicial branch free from the pressures and overstepping of
the executive and legislative branches. 1 10
There was great concern by persons in the legal community that
the pressures which existed as a result of political alliances would
result in a disregard of the qualifications of indiviiduals being considered for judicial positions.'1 1 Senatorial Courtesy, as a method of
exerting this pressure, was seen by many as the chief culprit in the
furtherance of political influence on the judicial branch. During the
1950's and 1960's, these fears were magnified by the declining
number of nominations. 112 This was due, in large part, to the hesitation to accept nominations by those "whose legal credentials w[ere]
unimpeachable," but who lacked the required political connections
which would enable speedy confirmation of their nominations." 3
Unless qualifications for judicial positions could be placed ahead of
"political expediency," it was feared that those with the highest
qualifications would refuse nominations. 114 The decline in quality of judicial appointments was seen as a more severe long range effect than
the more widely reported results of Senatorial Courtesy, such as delays in civil litigation." 5 Much of the criticism of the courtesy
rule ' 6 was based upon the conclusion that even with the delays of

109

Nelson, Variations on a Theme-Selection and Tenure of Judges, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 4, 6

(1962). In California, there is no check on the Governor's power to appoint judges to the trial
court level, since "no advice or consent of any legal body in the state is required." Id. at 4. For
a general discussion of the selection process in different states, see E. HAYNES, SELECTION AND
TENURE OF JUDGES (1944).
110 Nelson, supra note 109, at 6.

"1 Selection of Judges in New Jersey, 85 N.J.L.J. 520 (1962).
112

Id.

The Law Journal placed blame for the situation upon "the Legislature's functions with

respect to the judiciary," such as the need for confirmation of judicial nominations. Id. Those
individuals who would normally desire a judicial nomination were hesitant as a result of such a
complex political process which could result in their nomination sitting in committee indefinitely. Id.

Id.
Id.
115 Selection of Judges in New Jersey-What Price Senate Advice, 85 N.J.L.J.496 (1962). This
113

114

editorial further stated:
We see a nominee opposed for the reason that a Senator wants the judicial post for
himself. We see a nomination rejected under the questionable custom of Senatorial
"courtesy" because the man is personally obnoxious to the Senator of his county. It

is hard to understand how any Senator's personal likes and dislikes of individuals
have any bearing whatsoever on the public good.
Id.
1

Id.
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the Senate confirming process, those being appointed were not proving to be able judges. 1 1 7 Such delays were considered to be a "waste
of time" and therefore "inexcusable." 118
By the early 1960's, there was a call to re-evaluate the judicial
article with respect to judicial selection. 1 19 The Senate had already
been accused in prior years of attempting to use its advice and
consent power to usurp the Governor's power of nomination. 120 It
was maintained that the original purpose of the advice and consent
clause was to ensure that the executive's nominations were not "unworthy or improper." 121 It was not meant to be a method of compelling the Governor to make such nominations as a senator's prefer12 2
ences would dictate.
Many concluded that the advice and consent clause was not functioning as had been intended by those who drafted the 1844 constitution. The ability of the judicial branch to "secure and enforce observance" of its decisions was founded upon judicial independence from
other branches of government and freedom from partisan ties as
well. 1 23 In September of 1961 there were fifteen judicial vacancies
117 Id.
I'sId.
119 Selection of Judges in New Jersey or Should Article VI Be Amended, 85 N.J.L.J. 484
(1962). The pressure for reform in New Jersey came in the wake of action in other states to
improve court structure and judicial selection systems. In 1962, New York had adopted a unified court system: its first major change in the structure of its courts since 1846. Id. In addition
"[b]ar associations in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Minnesota" and other states had adopted selection
systems similar to the "'Missouri Plan." Id. For a further discussion of the Missouri Plan, see A
Modern Judicial Selection Plan-An Elusive Plan, 95 N.J.L.J. 168 (1962).
At the convention of 1947, proposals to establish a Judicial Nominating Commission were
not generally accepted by the delegates. See note 97 supra.
120 Advice and Consent of the Senate,78 N.J.L.J. 60 (1955). The basis behind such allegations
was use of the courtesy rule to satisfy personal grudges or to further the individual senator's
career. Many felt that senators were using the rule to test the Governor-to see how far the
executive branch could be pushed. See id. If Senatorial Courtesy has been utilized to such an
extent that the Governor has lost his power to choose nominees, then is there not a basis for
the charge that senators are overstepping their powers? See J. HARRIS, supra note 72, at 216.
121 Advice and Consent of Senate, supra note 120, at 60.
122 Id. In many cases the senator's preferences are dictated by his political attachments.
Thus, unknown to the general public, it became possible for groups of politicians in each state
to dictate who will serve as judges in their jurisdiction. See J. HARRIS, supra note 72, at 216.
123 See Miller, Politics and the Courts: The Struggle for Good Judges Goes On, 42 A.B.A.J.
939 (1956). As part of the long campaign by the American Bar Association (A.B.A.) to remove
the appointment of federal judges from politics, the assembly and the house of delegates of the
A.B.A. adopted a resolution at its 1951 annual meeting which contained the following proposals:
(a) That only the best qualified persons available shall be selected for appointment
to judicial offices; and
(b) That the President, before nominating, and the Senate before confirming shall
request the report and the recommendations of the Judiciary Committee of the
American Bar Association.
Id. at 940.
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in Trenton several of which were being delayed as a result of the
process of advice and consent. Others were being stalled due to a
failure of the Governor to make nominations, while he bargained with
the "appropriate Senators on acceptable nominees." 124
Proposals were put forward to amend article VI so as to limit the
time span during which a nomination could be delayed. 12 5 A provision, such as that contained in the 1944 proposed constitution, which
required the Senate to confirm or reject the nomination within six
weeks after submission, was seen by some as a solution to the prob126
lem.
The one solution most often mentioned as a feasible method of
assuring judicial selections satisfactory to the public was the nonpartisan nominating commission-the "Missouri Plan." 127 This approach was viewed as a viable alternative to the present system since
interaction between members of the nominating commission would
serve to lessen the partisan influences in the selection process. 12 8

124 Selection of Judges in New Jersey-What Price Senate Advice, supra note 115, at 496.
The dissatisfaction in New Jersey was accentuated further by the continuing saga in
Washington. It was reported in 1959 that fifty nominations for federal judgeships, were still
being held up by the Senate. Since 1930, in the United States Senate, a senator has been
expected to give any relevant facts to support his objection to a certain nomination. This serves
the specific purpose of allowing the Senate to evaluate the reasons underlying the objection and
decide if they are adequate. J. HARRIS, supra note 72, at 219.
It was once said by United States Senator E. D. Thomas, however, that Senatorial Courtesy "isa necessary development in the perfecting of an extra-constitutional part in our Federal
system practice." 84 CONG. REC. 1284 (1939) (remarks of Senator Elbert D. Thomas). Senator
Thomas further stated: "It is as essential to the proper functioning of party government under
our Federal plan as any other extra-constitutional function, such as, for example, our nationalconvention system." Id. Almost eighteen years earlier, Senator John Sharp Williams of Mississippi had said of Senatorial Courtesy:
Get rid of this "courtesy of the Senate." The Senate has a right to pass upon appointments. The Constitution secures it that right, and I suppose that being a constitutionally guaranteed right, it is a right in a sense "in discretion," but in sound
morals and ethics it is not a right in discretion, except "in judicial discretion."
61 CONG. REC. 1454 (1921). In New Jersey, the Senate was also composed of those in support
and those in opposition to the courtesy rule. See notes 171-75 infra and accompanying text.
However, it was often difficult to discern a particular senator's philosophy; senators who previously voiced opposition to Senatorial Courtesy would find themselves in a situation where they
must use the courtesy tool to keep their base of political power intact in their own county. See
note 171-79 infra and accompanying text.
125 Selection of Judges in New Jersey or Should Article VI Be Amended, supra note 119, at
484.
126 For a discussion of the fate of the 1944 constitution, see note 93 supra
and accompanying
text. See R. CONNORS, CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, supra note 90, at 65-116.
127 A Modern Judicial Selection Plan-An Elusive Goal, supra note 119, at 168.
128 See R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR 145
(1969). The Missouri Bar Association's Committee on Amendments, Judiciary and Procedure
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Plans such as this however, while serving to highlight the evils which
existed, made little headway in effectuating actual change.
In addition, proposals within the legislature itself, by members of
the Senate dissatisfied with the appointive process, met with similar
problems. In 1966, Senator Ned J. Parsekian sought to effectuate a
Senate rule change which would have provided for a sixty-day limit
within which nominations must be brought before the entire Senate
for confirmation or rejection. 129 The main goal of such a rule change
would have been to hasten the nominations out of committee where
the courtesy rule most often stalled the process. Such a rule change,
while potentially effective, proved unable to meet the challenges of
those in support of Senatorial Courtesy.
In essence, these proponents for reform of the judicial selection
process sought to re-establish a balance of power. The 1844 and 1947
constitutional conventions had attempted to create a method for the
legislative and executive branches to maintain a check on each other.
Many thought, however, that it was achieved at the expense of an
independent judiciary. As Chief Justice Vanderbilt wrote: "We need
judges-beholden to no man independent and honest and-equally
important-believed by all men to be independent and honest." 1 3 °

presented a plan in 1936 which was the basis for the plan finally adopted in 1940. The proposal
read:
We strongly favor a system whereby judges are to be appointed by an official and
responsible authority, whose power of appointment, however, is to be guided by a
body of intelligent opinion and subject to final control by popular will effectively
voiced through the ballot.
D. PATTERSON, THE MIssoURI PLAN FOR THE SELECTION OF JUDGES 49 (1945). Despite the

stated goals of the Missouri Plan which include bipartisanship, a greater number of those
selected for judgeships were attached to the state's dominant party than before the plan. However, the consensus is that the quality of judges selected under the plan is better than in
previous years prior to the adoption of the plan. R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, supra at 344-45.
129 Parsekian Moves to Completely Abolish "Senatorial Courtesy," 89 N.J.L.J. 389 (1966).
The proposed rule changes contained five major sections.
(1) The report of the Judiciary Committee must be in writing ....
(2) The report must show how each member signing the report voted upon the
nomination ....
(3) Under any circumstances a nomination must be brought before the entire Senate 60 days after referral to the Judiciary Committee ....
(4) The names of the Senators voting for or against a nomination are now a matter
of public record ....
(5) A nominee can today demand and receive a public hearing or a private hearing,
at his choice, by the Judiciary Committee ....
Id. The 60 Day rule has since been eliminated. The other rule changes have had little effect on
the courtesy rule itself. Seiler, supra note 9, at 750; SENATE RULES XX, para. 149 (1973).
130 A. VANDERBILT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORM 11 (1955).
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CHALLENGES IN THE COURTS

The courtesy rule was first tested in a New Jersey courtroom in
the 1966 case of Kligerman v. Lynch. 131 This litigation arose in response to the failure of the State Senate on June 6, 1966, to confirm a
judicial nomination to the Atlantic County Court. 13 2 The reasons
given for the rejection of the nomination were "purely personal
reasons" on the part of the senator from Atlantic County.' 3 3 As a
result of this objection, Senatorial Courtesy was invoked and no other
senators voted to "affirm the appointment." 134
The suit was instituted by residents of Atlantic County in the
chancery division of the superior court. 13 5 One question focused
upon in the case was whether the plaintiffs, as citizens, had standing
to bring the action. 136 The basis of their claim was the "unalienable
right of every citizen to ask that his government be properly administered."

137

Their contention was that as citizens of Atlantic County

they had been injured as a result of improper action by the state
senators. 138 Blocking the appointment of a qualified man to the
judiciary in Atlantic County allegedly prevented citizens in that
county from obtaining a speedy and efficient determination of their
legal rights. 139
131 92
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.

N.J. Super. 373, 223 A.2d 511 (Ch. Div.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 822 (1966).
at 375, 223 A.2d at 512.

at 374-75, 223 A.2d at 511-12.
at 378, 223 A.2d at 514.
In support of their contention, the plaintiffs cited Haines v. Burlington County Bridge
Comm'n, 1 N.J. Super. 163, 63 A.2d 284 (App. Div. 1949). 92 N.J. Super. at 378, 223 A.2d at
514. The Haines case involved the use of tax monies for the acquisition of bridges. Such an
issue was more closely related to the interests of the general public. The court in Haines held
that the plaintiffs did have sufficient interest to maintain an action against the Burlington
County Bridge Commission and others for a declaration that N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:5-18 (West
1925), and resolutions of both the Board of Freeholders of the County and the Commission,
relating to the acquisition of bridges, were void. I N.J. Super. at 170-71, 63 A.2d at 287-88.
However, even without the showing of an increased tax burden on the general public, taxpayers
and citizens have been allowed to maintain suits to remedy the wrongful acts of public officials.
See Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 337 (Sup. Ct. 1789).
In addition, court interference in action by public officials which affect public rights have
been allowed even where a question of public taxation was not even remotely at issue. See Tube
Reducing Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 1 N.J. 177, 62 A.2d 473 (1948);
Demoura v. Newark, 74 N.J. Super. 49, 180 A.2d 513 (App. Div. 1962); Oliver v. Jersey City,
63 N.J.L. 91, 42 A. 781 (Sup. Ct. 1899), revd on other grounds, 63 N.J.L. 634, 44 A. 709 (Ct.
Err- & App. 1899); Theurer v. Borrone. 81 N.J. Super. 188, 195 A.2d 215 (Law Div. 1963). For
further discussion of the standing issue, see Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50 HARV.
L. REv. 171, 231 (1936); Note, 24 GEO. L. J. 974, 976-78 (1936).
138 92 N.J. Super. at 378, 223 A.2d at 514.
139 Id.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:117

The court, in response to this argument, stated that no injury
had been inflicted directly on the public, rather it was the "rejected
nominee" who was directly affected. 14 0 In the court's view, it was
too "unreasonable" to hear suits by parties who do not have "such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues." 141
In addition, the plaintiffs contended that the Senatorial Courtesy
custom was "an improper exercise" of the constitutional power of advice and consent to judicial appointments. 142 Therefore, they argued
that the court possessed the authority to hear and determine the matter. 14 3 The plaintiffs further asserted that the advice and consent
clause required that "reasonable judgment" be used in the formation
of opinions by individual senators. 144
140 Id. at 378-79, 223 A.2d 514 (citing Bond v. Floyd, 251 F. Supp. 333, 339 (N.D. Ga.
1966)). The Bond case involved the refusal by the Georgia State Senate to seat a member,
Julian Bond, as a result of alleged pacifist activities. 251 F. Supp. at 336. The action was
brought by Bond and two residents of his district. The two residents were deemed not to have
standing, since they did not have "such a direct interest in the litigation as would give them
standing to bring the complaint." 251 F. Supp. at 339.
141 92 N.J. Super. at 379, 223 A.2d at 515 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)). For
a detailed discussion of the political question doctrine, see note 157 infra and accompanying
text.
142 92 N.J. Super. at 375, 223 A.2d at 512.
113 Id. The plaintiffs contended further "that rejection of qualified nominees for personal
reasons is so arbitrary" as not to be in conformity "with the power vested in the Senate." Id.
They asserted that the draftsmen of the constitution never intended this check on the power of
appointment to supersede a "properly exercised executive function." Id. For a discussion of the
1844 draftsmen's intentions, see notes 62-89 supra and accompanying text.
144 Id. at 377, 223 A.2d at 513 (citing In re Opinion of Justices, 190 Mass. 616, 78 N.E. 311
(Sup.Jud. Ct. 1906)). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts spoke at some length on
the "advice and consent" power. The court said of the council that:
the act, first of all, and afterwards for all time, is to be the act of the Governor. The
only connection that the council can have with it is advisory. Whether the Governor
takes advice or not, his conclusion must rest finally upon his own judgment. Inasmuch as the responsibility for his determination, with or without advice, must rest
upon him, both in the beginning and forever after, the natural course of proceeding
would seem to be that he should seek such aid as he might desire from any proper
source, and not be obliged to ask advice.
190 Mass. at 619-20, 78 N.E. at 312. The Massachusetts court viewed the advice and consent
clause as implying only "participation in the affirmative act of the Governor." Id. In other
words, it was the act of appointment on the part of the Governor which was the essential act,
not the advisory capacity of the council. See id.
The plaintiffs also cited United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892). 92 N.J. Super. at 377,
223 A.2d at 514. The Ballin case involved the validity of a specific rule (Rule XV) of the House
of Representatives which allowed non-voting members to be counted "in determining the presence of a quorum to do business." 144 U.S. at 11. The court distinguished this case from the
case at hand, since Ballin involved an actual rule of the United States Senate while Kligerman
dealt with "an unwritten rule" or "custom." 92 N.J. Super. at 377-78, 223 A.2d at 514.
The plaintiffs also relied on Murphy v. Casey,'300 Mass. 232, 15 N.E.2d 268 (Sup. Jud.
Ct. 1938). 92 N.J. Super. at 377, 223 A.2d at 513. The Murphy court, espousing a view similar
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The court conceded that the drafters of the New Jersey Constitution never intended the advice and consent clause to be used in such
a manner. Despite this conclusion, the court determined that it did
not possess the power to "rectify the situation." 145 Although, an
"elective representative" might abuse his power under the clause,
the
court believed that if this abuse fell short of violating the constitution,
a remedy could not be supplied by a "court of law." 146 In the
court's opinion, there was no "justiciable constitutional question"
under these facts which could justify a "judicial inquiry into . . . [the]
147
alleged custom" of Senatorial Courtesy.
Within three years, Senatorial Courtesy was again under direct
attack in the courtroom. Passaic County Bar Association v. Hughes 148
arose under circumstances similar to those in Kligerman. On April
10th and August 6th, 1969, Governor Richard J. Hughes submitted
nominations for several vacant Passaic County judgeships to the Senate for its advice and consent. 14 9 The Senate's inaction on these
nominations necessitated a suspension of the trial of civil cases in Passaic County, effective September of the 1969 court term. 150
The Passaic County Bar Association, as plaintiffs, instituted an
action in the chancery division of the superior court before Judge
Worrall Mountain. 15 1 The bar association contended that such a susto that of the Massachusetts court in In re Opinion of Justices, held that the advice and consent
power of the legislature was to be exercised in a reasonable manner to form "a proper judgment
on the matter before it." 300 Mass. at 237, 15 N.E.2d at 271. It was emphasized by the Mur-

phy court that the final responsibility will always be in the Governor, and therefore the power
to make the decision and act is in the Governor. The legislative body (council) did not have the
ability to act on its own; its duty was to act in an advisory capacity to the Governor. Id.

145 92 N.J. Super. at 375, 223 A.2d at 512. The court focused on the 1844 constitutional
convention and acknowledged that the delegates were fully aware of the dangers "inherent"
under such a system of appointment. However, the court further stressed that the delegates
also "realized that they were powerless to correct or control the abuses." Id. at 376, 223 A.2d at
513. In addition, the court stated that since the delegates themselves felt they were powerless
to correct the abuses which might inure, surely they would not have vested the power in the
courts of New Jersey to take such action. Id.
146 Id. at 376-77, 223 A.2d at 513. The court felt that the act of rejecting the nomination for
whatever reason was "sufficient to comply with the 'advice and consent' clause" of the New

Jersey Constitution. Id. at 378, 223 A.2d at 514.
147 Id.

at 378, 223 A.2d at 514. For a further discussion of justiciability and the political

question doctrine, see note 157 infra and accompanying text.
148 108 N.J. Super. 161, 260 A.2d 261 (Ch. Div. 1969).
149 Id. at 164-65, 260 A.2d at 263. A vacancy occurred in the office of judge of the juvenile
and domestic relations court on April 28, 1967. A new county court judgeship was created by
act of the legislature on June 28, 1967. On September 7, 1967, a Passaic County District Court
judge died. Then on August 1, 1969, a judge of the Passaic County Court was mandatorily
retired by reason of age. Id.
150 Id. at 165, 260 A.2d at 263. Since there was a priority put on criminal cases in terms of
allocation of judges for trials, pending civil trials were subject to suspension.
151 Id. at 163, 260 A.2d at 262.
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pension of pending civil litigation "amount[ed] to a breakdown in the
mechanism of State Government." 152 They first sought a writ of
mandamus to "compel the Executive and Legislative Branches of the
State Government to act." 153 Second, they sought to enjoin the use
of Senatorial Courtesy. 154 Finally, they requested that the court define the advice and consent clause, determine the status of pending
nominations, and declare that the practice of Senatorial Courtesy was
both illegal and unconstitutional. 155
The primary issue which faced the court was the constitutionality
of Senatorial Courtesy. However, the court in rendering its decision
chose to avoid this question. 156 Instead, it focused upon the issue of
"justiciability," 1'7 and based its decision on the "political question

152Id. at 165, 260 A.2d at 263--64. The Passaic County Bar Association is a non-profit membership corporation. Id. at 163, 260 A.2d at 262. At that time it had a membership of about 650
lawyers, "in good standing, practicing or residing in the County of Passaic." Id. at 163, 260
A.2d at 262--63. The complaint charged in effect that there were too many judicial vacancies in
the county, and that these resources had existed for an undue period of time. Further, the
complaint alleged that as a result of a continuous failure to fill the vacancies the civil litigation in
Passaic County had come to a halt. Id. at 163-464, 260 A.2d at 263. The situation the complaint
asserted was caused by "improper inaction on the part of the Governor and the Senate." Id. at
164, 260 A.2d at 263.
153 Id. at 166, 260 A.2d at 264. The plaintiff had sought a writ of mandamus to compel the
Governor to take action. The issue arose as to whether the Governor could be forced to issue
the appropriate commissions. Id. at 174, 260 A.2d at 268. The court held that the actions of the
executive were "beyond the reach of judicial supervision." Id. at 174, 260 A.2d at 269. Further,
the court held there was no controversy as to this issue since the Governor had in fact acted
with regard to all the existing vacancies, by making the respective nominations. Id. at 175, 260
A.2d at 269. For a further discussion of mandamus, see note 213 infra and accompanying text.
154 Id. at 166, 260 A.2d at 264.
155Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. It is not a strict rule that all controversies political in nature will be "political ques-

tions." When a question arises as to whether the doctrine should be invoked, the court will
study the issue and make a conclusion as to its justicability. If the court should determine that
the issue is nonjusticable, it will invoke the political question doctrine to prove a basis for their
conclusions. See generally Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARV. L. REv. 296 (1925).
The chief difficulty is defining exactly what is a political issue. It is most often stated that a
political question is one which has "been entrusted by the sovereign for decision to the so-called
political departments of government, as distinguished from questions which the sovereign has
set to be decided in the courts." Sevilla v. Elizalde, 112 F.2d 29, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1940). Even in
governmental structures where there is no express constitutional language as to the delegation
of powers "this limitation upon judicial authority has long been recognized." Id. The political
question doctrine stems from the separation of powers principle that each branch of government
must always be able to maintain its independence from the other branches of government.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). The dominant considerations in determining political
questions are "the appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality to the
action of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination .. ."Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939); Dickson v. Ford, 521 F.2d 234,
235-36 (5th Cir. 1975).
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doctrine" as set forth in the separation of powers clause of the New
Jersey Constitution. 158 The court reasoned that it "was not the intention of the framers of the Constitutions of 1844 and 1947" to enable the courts to review the internal functions of the legislature,
159
where these functions were not written into the constitution.
Based on this determination, Judge Mountain held that the case was

The test as applied in Baker v. Carr first involved the question of whether there had been
a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department. " 369 U.S. at 217. However, the mere fact that a branch of government is vested with
a certain power does not make it immune from judicial review. See id. A court must determine
whether the actions of the branch of government are within the bounds of constitutionality. 92
N.J. Super. at 378, 223 A.2d at 514. The ability to undertake such an analysis is not an assertion
of superiority on the part of the judicial branch, rather it is a function of the general scheme of
checks and balances. Denison v. State, 61 S.W.2d 1017, 1019 (Tex. Civ. App.), error refused,
122 Tex. 459, 61 S.W. 1022 (1933).
One interesting area has been the reapportionment and redistricting cases. The United
States Supreme Court had concluded that the issues involved were nonjusticiable. E.g., Carrol
v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380, 381-82 (1932) (desiring suit to enjoin Secretary of State of Minnesota
from acting under Minnesota redistricting legislation); Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375, 376-77
(1932); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 570 (1916).
However, in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), a case involving congressional redistricting, some members of the court expressed a different view. Three justices agreed that the case
was political and therefore nonjusticiable. 328 U.S. at 500 (Frankfurter, J., majority opinion).
The concurring justice disagreed with this reasoning, but concurred in the result because he felt
it would be inequitable to issue an injunction. Id. at 565 (Rutledge, J., concurring). The three
dissenting justices thought the question was justiciable and would have granted the relief
sought. Id. at 566 (Black, J., dissenting); see C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 54 (3d ed. 1976). The stance taken by the dissenting justices in Colegrove has been
expressed by the Supreme Court in several per curiam opinions dealing with similar situations.
E.g., Matthews v. Hendley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959); Rydford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1956); Kiddv.
McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956); Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952); Remmey v. Smith, 342
U.S. 916 (1952). The Supreme Court, in South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950), noted that
federal courts were "consistently refus[ing] to exercise their equity powers in cases posing political issues arising from a state's geographical distribution of electoral strength among its political
subdivisions." 339 U.S. at 277.
This is indicative of a trend to allow federal courts to delve into areas which in the past
might have been considered out of their reach. This does not mean that the floodgates are
open, rather the considerations of justiciability and political question are to be decided in each
case individually. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553, 561 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
For a further discussion of the different views regarding the poltical question doctrine, see
Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. REv. 485 (1924);
Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REv. 338, 344-45 (1924); Scharpf, Judicial
Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 535-48 (1966).
158 108 N.J. Super. at 166, 260 A.2d at 264 (quoting N.J. CONST. art. III, para. 1). The
separation of powers clause in the New Jersey Constitution reads:
The powers of the government shall be divided among three distinct branches, the
legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or constituting one branch shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the
others, except as expressly provided in this Constitution.
N.J. CONST. art. III, para. 1.
159108 N.J. Super. at 172, 260 A.2d at 267.
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nonjusticiable.16 0 To buttress its decision, the court relied upon language in the United States Supreme Court opinion in Baker v.
Carr.161 In that case, the Supreme Court had stated that an issue
was a political question when it involved "a textually demonstratable
Constitutional commitment of the issue," 162 to either the legislative
or executive branches of government. 16 Noting that the Supreme
Court in Baker focused upon the political question doctrine "in relation to the national government and Federal Constitution,"'16 the
chancery court believed that some of the specific formulations set
forth in Baker were applicable to "the problem" on "the state
level. " 165
The court distinguished the Passaic County case from other cases
in which legislative procedures had been the subject of adjudication
in the courtroom. 16 6 Passaic County involved an unwritten rule,
while the other cases dealt with standards specifically contained
within the state constitution. 167 In the court's view, the absence of
any constitutional language left it with "In]o standards to guide judicial action." 168 As a result, there was "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards" with which to formulate a remedy. 16 9
In both Passaic County and Kligerman, the courts were faced with
the issue of the constitutionality of Senatorial Courtesy. The outcome

160

Id. at 172-73, 260 A.2d at 267-68.

161 Id.
162

Id.

at 168, 260 A.2d at 265 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
at 168, 260 A.2d at 265 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).

This is in

effect an examination of whether a particular issue is appropriate for judicial inquiry. The goal is
the maintenance of the structure of the branches of government as established in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
16

108 N.J. Super. at 173, 260 A.2d at 268.

164

Id.

at 168, 260 A.2d at 265. This raises an interesting question as to whether the political

question doctrine maintains the same effect with respect to federal courts dealing with questions
arising under state constitutions. The court in Blount v. Mandel, 400 F. Supp. 1190 (D. Md.
1975), stated that: "The political question doctrine has nothing whatever to do with the power of

the federal judiciary to review the actions of a state legislature or any other branch of state
government." Id.

at 1195. This case involved an action by local voters and members of the

Maryland General Assembly, holding fulltime positions with local boards of education, who
challenged reductions in their salaries as a result of their outside positions. The court held that
the individuals did have standing to bring such a suit. Id. at 1196.
165 108 N.J. Super. at 168, 260 A.2d at 265.
166 Id. at 173, 260 A.2d at 268 (citing Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)). In Powell,
the Supreme Court was faced with article 1, section 2, clause 2, of the United States Constitu-

tion which "sets forth the exclusive qualifications for membership" in the house. Powell, 395
U.S. at 493. The court had specific standards with which it could formulate a decision in the
case.
167

108 N.J. Super. at 173, 260 A.2d at 268.

Id.
169Id.
168

(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217).
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of both cases was similar. The courts chose to focus upon issues which
would enable them to circumvent the major issue and still render h
decision. 170
The use of Senatorial Courtesy has not diminished in the wake of
the cases challenging its constitutionality. 17 1 During the 1976-1977
legislative term, five appointments were blocked in Passaic
County, 1 7 2 and nine more were similarly treated in Essex
County. 1 73 Many have begun to view Senatorial Courtesy as "excessive authority vested in the legislature" having the "potential for
obstructing government processes." 174 It has had the effect of "chasing away qualified individuals from positions." 175
SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite the failure of such direct attacks on Senatorial Courtesy
as those presented in Kligerman and Passaic County, opposition to
the custom is increasing. In recent years, various groups have called
for another case to test the constitutionality of Senatorial Courtesy. 1 76 It is becoming apparent that when judicial selection suffers
as a result of pressure from the political sphere, it is the citizenry

170 108 N.J. Super. at 166, 260 A.2d at 264; 92 N.J. Super. at 378, 223 A.2d at 514.
171 Newark Star Ledger, Sept. 10, 1976, at 14, col. 1.
172 Id. Governor Brenden Byrne was an outspoken critic of Senatorial Courtesy at the time.

The Governor recommended that the Chief Justice of the state supreme court take appropriate
action, using his "broad power" to make transfers. Id.
173 Id., Oct. 8, 1976, at 21, col. 1. There was discussion among the Essex delegation of
stripping the Essex County senator of the power to block nominations since his actions were
without any apparent reasons. One member of the Essex delegation stated: "I'm not trying to
bust up Courtesy, I'm trying to make sure there is not abuse." Id.
On February 19, 1976, Senator Wiley, as chairman of the Senate Rules Committee, introduced rule changes which "would have required that a nomination be released to the full Senate after 60 days." 9 LEGISLATIVE ROUNDUP 7 (Mar. 1976). The opposition would then have to

be heard in"public session." Id. Senator Beadleston rose in defense of the practice "as necessary
to protect the nominee by preventing damaging information [sic] about him from being made
public." Id. The Senator "attributed the ... [debate] over Senatorial Courtesy to the media
and to a few 'headhunters who want to be in on everything in the state."' Id.
Senator Menza responded: "'Let's not be hyprocritical [sic]. It's really nothing but political
power. It's leverage with the Governor. You and I know that nominations come from the back
room of the county chairman's office."' Id.
174 Newark Star Ledger, Aug. 30, 1976, at 12, col. 1.
175 Judicial and County Prosecutor Appointments Committee Report, 95 N.J.L.J. 481, 490
(1971). In the fall of 1969, the New Jersey State Bar Association "effected and formalized"
procedures for liaison with the Governor on Judicial Selection and appointment. Id. at 481. The
process involves the "screening" of judicial candidates by both the judicial selection committee
and the judicial and county prosecutors appointments committee of the state bar association.
Id.; see Rosenberg, Improving Selection of Judges on Merit, 56 JUDICATURE 240, 242 (1973).
176 See Newark Star Ledger, Sept. 15, 1976, at 28, col. 1; see note 12 supra.
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which suffers and not just the nominees. 1 77 As a result of this increased awareness, a variety of groups have recently sought changes
which would keep the judicial branch responsive to the people and
78
not to the political parties.'
Judicial Solutions
Assuming a suit is instituted, the question remains as to whether
the controversy is justiciable.1 79 If a court is willing to take the appropriate steps and establish a basis for itself by constitutional interpretation, such an action would be available to correct the abuses
which exist. 18 0 Even in light of continuing abuse, the judiciary continues to set limits for itself and not deal with Senatorial Courtesy
simply because the courtesy rule is regarded as an "unwritten rule."
The court itself must make the attempt to bring Senatorial Courtesy
within the scope of a reasonable constitutional limitation and deal
with it accordingly.

177 See Wiley, supra note 2, at 65; Judicial Selection, 94 N.J.L.J. 632 (1971). Senator Wiley
held the view that to attempt to form an "equality" of power between the Senate and the
Governor, through a concentration of "the power of the Senate in one Senator so that he/she
may bargain with the Governor, is a twisting of Constitutional design." 9 LEGISLATIVE
ROUNDUP 8 (Mar. 1976).
178 See A Bi-Partisan Bench: The Good and Bad of It, 98 N.J.L.J. 860 (1975);
Judicial Vacancies and Executive Clemency, 98 N.J.L.J. 1001, 1008 (1975) (excerpts from prepared remarks by
Governor Byrne at New Jersey State Bar Association's Mid-Year Meeting). At one point, Governor Byrne stated:
The power of the senate to reject nominations proposed by the Governor is not in
question. That is firmly entrenched in our constitutional system of checks and balances.
But it is a distortion of that power to permit a single Senator or a small minority of the senate to block a nomination secretly without any public explanation of
that action.
This is an anachronism, clearly in conflict with the concept of open government
that the public clearly demands and that we are striving to achieve .....
Judicial Vacancies and Executive Clemency, 98 N.J.L.J. at 1008.
179 See The Committee To Free The Fort Dix 38 v. Collins, 429 F.2d 807, 811 (3d Cir.
1970). In Collins, the court set forth a two-step test for justiciability on this issue:
"First, we must decide whether the claim presented and the relief sought are the
type which admit of judicial resolution .. " That is, the court must determine
whether "the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially defined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded .. "
The second part of the justiciability question requires a determination "whether
the structure of the Federal Government renders the issue presented a 'political
questions'-that is, a question which is not justiciable in federal court because of
the separation of powers provided by the Constitution ....""
Id. (citations omitted).
'1oSee note 12 infra.
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It is the duty of the courts to ensure that legislative action is in
compliance with the constitution, both state and federal. 1 8 1 The
highest court in the state "as the designated last-resort guarantor of
the Constitution's command, possesses and must use power equal to
its responsibility." 182 As a result, it is sometimes necessary for the
court "in response to a constitutional mandate" to move into areas
normally controlled by the legislative or executive branches.1 8 3 For
example, in cases where the court had found certain apportionment
schemes to be unconstitutional, the legislature was given a certain
amount of time within which to remedy the situation. If no legislative
a duty to
action took place, the court believed itself to be under
18 4
create a plan of apportionment which was constitutional.
With regard to the standing of individuals to bring such a suit,
the courts have in the past held that it was the frustrated nominee
who was harmed by Senatorial Courtesy, not the citizen. 18 5 Therefore, no standing existed for a citizen or taxpayer to bring such a
suit.186 However, the delays in litigation and the negative effects on
judicial selection cause both direct and indirect harm to the general
public. 1 8 7 We cannot forget that government exists to serve the
people. Thus, when any process of a government is slowed or halted,
181 Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 154, 351 A.2d 713, 724 (1975).
182 Id.

at 154, 351 A.2d at 724.

Id. (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 512 (1969)); see Pascack Ass'n Ltd. v.
Mayor & Council of Washington, 131 N.J. Super. 195, 329 A.2d 89 (Law Div. 1974). Pascack
Ass'n involved a zoning dispute wherein the court stated:
Where the duty to be enforced by judicial decree impinges upon the exercise
of executive or legislative functions by coordinate branches of government, remedial
judicial intervention has been and should be exercised only as a last resort and after
the legislative or executive branch has defaulted in its obligation to act.
Id. at 204, 329 A.2d at 94-95. The court relied on Jackman v. Bodine, 53 N.J. 585, 252 A.2d
209 (1969), in which the New Jersey supreme court declared that the New Jersey Constitution's
legislative apportionment scheme was in violation of the Federal Constitution. Id. at 588, 252
A.2d at 210.
14 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 570 (1964). Reynolds dealt with the apportionment plan
in effect in Alabama. The district court had concluded that the plan was unconstitutional and
efforts by the Alabama legislature failed to produce a constitutional plan. Id.
185 92 N.J. Super. at 378-79, 223 A.2d at 514. For a detailed discussion of the ruling on the
standing issue in Kligernan, see notes 135-41 supra and accompanying text.
186 92 N.J. Super. at 378-79, 223 A.2d at 515.
187 In Kligerman, the court found no standing on the part of the citizens as taxpayers to bring
'8

the suit. This illustrates a lack of insight into the numerous effects the use of Senatorial Courtesy was having. See Singleton v. Wueff, 428 U.S. 106, 113 (1976). In Singleton, two Missourilicensed physicians were given standing to maintain an action for injunctive relief and a
declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality for a Missouri statute excluding abortions not "'medically indicated." id.; see Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (standing
upheld for Senator Kennedy seeking declaratory judgment that presidential pocket veto of bill
was ineffective).
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its citizens always suffer. In the leading case on standing, Crescent
Park Tenants Association v. Realty Equities Corp., 1 88 the New Jersey
supreme court, in an opinion by Justice Jacobs, articulated the standard of review. The court stated that it has "confined litigation to
those situations where the litigant's concern with the subject matter
evidenced a sufficient stake and real adverseness." 189 Noting that it
has "given due weight to the interests of individual justice, along with
the public interest," Justice Jacobs indicated that the court has
"sweeping reject[ed] procedural frustrations in favor of 'just and
expeditious determinations on the ultimate merits.' "190
Declaratory Judgment
The time is ripe in New Jersey for the courts to deal directly
with Senatorial Courtesy. One possible method which might be
employed would be a declaratory judgment.191 The New Jersey Declaratory Judgments Act provides: "All courts of record in this state
shall, within their respective jurisdictions, have power to declare
rights, status and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is
or could be claimed .... ."192 In construing the declaratory judgments act, the supreme court has required certain prerequisites before it will grant declaratory relief. In New Jersey Turnpike Authority
188 58 N.J. 98, 275 A.2d 433 (1971).
189 Id.

at 107, 275 A.2d at 438.
190 Id. at 107-08, 275 A.2d at 438 (quoting Tumarkin v. Friedman, 17 N.J. Super. 20, 27, 85
A.2d 304, 307 (App. Div. 1951), certif, denied, 9 N.J. 287, 83 A.2d 239 (1952)).
191 There has been an increase in the tendency of the courts to issue declaratory relief in
cases involving a controversy which has not reached the stage where coercive remedies are

available. See Rego Indus., Inc. v. American Modern Metals Corp., 91 N.J. Super. 447, 45253, 221 A.2d 35, 38 (App. Div. 1966). Under the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 2201 to 2202 (1976), the federal courts determine whether the facts of the case entail
a true controversy between parties having opposing interests of such "immediacy and reality to
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S.
498, 506 (1972). The case must present a "substantial controversy." Golden v. Zwickler, 394
U.S. 103, 108 (1969).
In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), the Supreme Court held that the use of
declaratory relief was appropriate in a case raising a constitutional issue of the utmost impor-

tance and sensitivity. See id. at 496-99. The federal courts have felt that declaratory relief is
available to provide a remedy in cases involving a constitutional issue. Ortiz v. Engelbrecht, 61

F.R.D. 381, 395 (D.N.J. 1973).
New Jersey has developed what may be deemed a "liberal" attitude toward granting declaratory relief. Rutan Estates, Inc. v. Town of Belleville, 56 N.J. Super. 330, 339, 152 A.2d
853, 858 (App. Div. 1959). It remains within the sound discretion of the court as to whether

declaratory relief should be granted. A large part of the court's attention is focused on "the
public need to resolve . . . [the] issue." Passaic Valley Sewage Comm'n v. City of Paterson, 113
N.J. Super. 148, 151, 273 A.2d 359, 361 (App. Div. 1971).
192 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:16-52 (West 1952).
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v. Parsons,193 the court stated that "[t]he first point to be considered"
is whether the controversy "is actual and bona fide or is merely one
in which 'the semblance of judicial proceedings and the form of due
process are present.' "194 In dealing with a dispute over the exercise
of Senatorial Courtesy, it is apparent that an "actual and bona fide"
controversy exists. The action would be instituted between adverse
parties with each litigant earnestly seeking an opposite determination. Furthermore, the unique public nature of this litigation provides
additional impetus for court action. In State v. Union County Park
Commission, 19 5 the court, in addressing the issue of whether the
State Highway Commissioner could condemn county parkland for
highway purposes, granted declaratory relief "[i]n view of the public
nature of the controverted legal questions and the likelihood of their
recurrence." 196 Surely, the proper and orderly functioning of the
state courts is of a greater public nature. In addition, as history has
proven, the controversy is likely to recur, unless definitively resolved
1
by the courts.

97

For a court to declare Senatorial Courtesy unconstitutional, it
would first have to establish a foundation upon which such a
determination could be based. One possible basis would be to define
the advice and consent clause and formulate the parameters within
which the advisory capacity of the Senate would exist. 198 Setting
specific standards by which to examine Senate action or inaction, the
court would then determine whether Senatorial Courtesy was within
the scope of the advice and consent power and thereby within constitutional limits. The ultimate limitation on Senatorial Courtesy
would be that the individual should be considered appointed when
there is no Senate action on the nomination within a reasonable time.
The court, as the final interpreter of the state constitution, would, in
effect, be reading into the clause a requirement of reasonablenesswith the [reasonable] advice and consent of the Senate." 199 The
most important goal is to impose some reasonable restraint on what

193 3 N.J. 235, 69 A.2d 875 (1949).
'9
Id. at 241, 69 A.2d at 877-78 (quoting New Jersey Bankers Ass'n v. Van Riper, 1 N.J.
193, 198, 62 A.2d 677, 679 (1948)).
195 48 N.J. 246, 225 A.2d 122 (1966).
196 Id. at 248-49, 225 A.2d at 123.
197 For an indication of the frequency of the exercise of Senatorial Courtesy, see notes

172-73 supra and accompanying text.
19'

For a discussion of the approach taken by the Ohio courts, see note 205 infra and accom-

panying text. This is a viable method to deal with Senatorial Courtesy. The court must create
their own avenues of access to cope with this problem.

199 N.J. CONST. art. V1, § 6, para. 1. The specific period could be sixty or ninety days.
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advice and consent is to entail in its constitutional context. This
would be a proper approach to the problem since it is the judicial
branch which has the duty to both interpret constitutional language
and maintain the effectiveness of the constitution as a basis of the
200
governmental structure.
Another method of constitutional interpretation of the advice and
consent power and senatorial courtesy can be found in recourse to
other clauses in the state constitution. The oath of offices for members of the legislature contained in article 4, section 8, paragraph 1 of
the New Jersey Constitution provides that the senator "will support
the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the
State of New Jersey and . . . will faithfully discharge the duties of
Senator . . . according to the best of my ability." 20 1 The oath, as set
forth in the constitution, instills an obligation on the part of the
senator to perform his functions in good faith as a public servant of
his constituents. The very fact that the senator would put a priority
on personal and party goals, while seeking to stall the normal functioning of governmental processes as provided for in the constitution,
20 2
is a clear violation of the oath of office.
In addition, the New Jersey Constitution specificially provides
under article 3, paragraph 1 that "[n]o person or persons belonging to
or constituting one branch shall exercise any of the powers properly
belonging to either of the others, except as expressly provided in this
Constitution." 203 The use of Senatorial Courtesy may be interpreted
as a usurpation by the legislature of the executive's power by exceed20 4
ing the scope of their advisory capacity in the appointive process.
In some states, Ohio, for example, the advice and consent language of
the respective constitutions has been interpreted as granting the state
Senate the capacity to review and reject appointments by the Gover-

200 Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. at 154, 351 A.2d at 724; see Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,

352--53 (1976). The judicial branch, as the protector of the constitution, must assure that governmental action conforms with constitutional language.
201 N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 8, para. 1.
202

See Bond v. Floyd, 251 F. Supp. 333, 336 (N.D. Ga. 1966). In Bond, the attempt by the

Georgia House of Representatives to prevent Julian Bond from taking his seat was based on the
contention that his pacifist activities against the Viet Nam war were in violation of his oath of
office. Id.
203 N.J. CONST. art. III, para. 1; see State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 370, 375 A.2d 607, 612
(1977); Brown v. Heymann, 62 N.J. 1, 11, 297 A.2d 572, 578 (1972). In Heymann, the court
concluded that the purpose of the separation of powers clause was to prevent a single branch
from "claiming or receiving inordinate power," not to dissuade the branches of government
from cooperation with each other. 62 N.J. at 11, 297 A.2d at 578.
204 9 LEGISLATIVE ROUNDUP 8 (Mar. 1976).
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nor, if dissatisfied with the selection.2 0 5 However, the selection or
choice is in the hands of the Governor; there is no right of selection
vested in the Senate. 2 0 6 The advice and consent clause in the Ohio
Constitution was interpreted as requiring "affirmative action on the
part of the Senate to reject the appointment;" if no action was forth20 7
coming, the Ohio Senate was deemed to have consented.
Injunctive Relief
Another potential tool for the courts to implement is injunctive
relief-"order the Senate to cease and desist from the practice of
senatorial courtesy." 20 8 This is a mode of relief resting within the
discretion of the court to grant or withhold. In order to grant injunctive relief, the courts have demanded that certain requirements be
met. In Ferraiuolov. Manno,2 0 9 the court stated that injunctive relief will be granted where "[t]he circumstances thus exhibited by the
moving papers show a potential irreparable injury, not adequately
compensable in damages." 2 1 0 Those harmed as a result of Senatorial
Courtesy clearly have no remedy at law, since money damages cannot
compensate for the damage inflicted. In addition, there is no doubt
that irreparable harm will be inflicted as a result of a judicial branch
not responsible to the needs of the public. 2 1 ' Pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 2 :2 -3 (a)(2 ), a request could be brought before the appellate division "to review final decisions or actions of any state
205 State v. Zellar, 7 Ohio St. 2d 109, 113, 218 N.E.2d 729, 732 (1966); see State v. Keller,
10 Ohio St. 2d 85, 88, 226 N.E.2d 743, 745 (1967).

The Ohio supreme court held that the

power of the Senate was a "negative power." Although able to reject the selections by the
Governor, the Ohio Senate could not take any affirmative steps to appoint or bargain for appointment on their own. 7 Ohio St. 2d at 113, 218 N.E.2d at 732. The fact that the court

deemed nonaction on the part of the Senate to be "consent" would mean a neutralization of the
effectiveness of Senatorial Courtesy. The reasoning behind such an analysis "is that the appointment is actually made by the Governor prior to its submission to the Senate." Id.

20- id. at 113, 218 N.E. 2d at 733.
207 Id.
208 108 N.J. Super. at 166, 260 A.2d at 264. The action would have the effect of preserving

the status quo and operate to restrain the continuance of the courtesy rule. The use of such a
mode of relief is totally within the discretion of the court. "To authorize an injunction, the court

must be reasonably satisfied that the threatened harm is likely to be committed." New Jersey
State AFL-CIO v. State Fed'n of Dist. Bds. of Educ., 93 N.J. Super. 31, 42, 224 A.2d 519, 525
(Ch.Div. 1966); Wyrough & Loser, Inc. v. Pelmor Laboratories, Inc., 367 F.2d 543, 548 (3d
Cir. 1967). Also, the injunctive relief will not be granted unless there are no other available

remedies. Penn Central Co. v. Buckley & Co., 293 F. Supp. 653, 658 (D.N.J. 1968), aff'd, 415
F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1969).
209 1 N.J. 105, 62 A.2d 141 (1948).
210 Id. at 108, 62 A.2d at 142.
211 For a discussion of possible harm, see notes 102-30 and accompanying text.
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officer . . . or to review the validity of any rule promulgated by such
. . . officer." 212 The action of the individual Senator in using
Senatorial Courtesy to block nominations would then be subject to
the courts' review. Furthermore, despite the fact Senatorial Courtesy
is an unwritten rule, it is a rule of the Senate and should be viewed
as such. Thus, the New Jersey courts have been empowered by the
state supreme court to take cognizance of the action.
Mandamus
A third related type of judicial relief would be the issuance of a
writ of mandamus. In implementing this relief, the court would order
the Senate to act on the pending nomination which was being stalled
in committee due to the exercise by one senator of the courtesy
power. 2 13 This type of relief would direct itself towards the specific
duty which rests upon the individual in an official status as a member
of the state Senate.214
The basis behind the use of mandamus is the principle that the
people of New Jersey have the right to demand that governmental
functions, as specified in the constitution, are performed. In Edelstein
v. Ferrell,21 5 the court stated that "[a]n order in the nature of a
mandamus is available only when there is a clear and definite right to
the performance of a ministerial duty, in essence mandatory and final." 2 16 In dealing with legislative involvement in judicial nominations, it is a clear duty of the Senate to act on the nominations sent to
it by the Governor.
This duty is comprised of both ministerial and discretionary acts.
The ministerial act, which could properly be subjected to a mandamus, is the action of advice and consent. The court could order the
Senate to act-to give the Governor its advice and consent. How2

212 N.J.R. 2:2-3(a)( ).

213 108 N.J. Super. at 166, 260 A.2d at 264. A writ of mandamus would be directed at the
senator in his capacity as a member of the legislature. The duty of the senator to act stems from
unambiguous consitutional language. Therefore, the Senate and senator are merely being told to
do exactly what they are obliged to do. In State Highway Comm'r of Missouri v. Volpe, 479
F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973), the United States Secretary of Transportation was deemed by the
court to be acting outside the scope of his power in withholding obligational authority of states
over highway funds for anti-inflationary purposes. Id. at 1118.
Mandamus would be inappropriate if directed at the Governor since the Governor has
fulfilled his obligations imposed by the constitution. The nominations which he makes and forwards to the Senate for confirmation are the basis of his constitutional duty.

2"4 Joseph v. Passaic Hosp. Ass'n, 26 N.J. 557, 571, 141 A.2d 18, 25 (1958).
25 120 N.J. Super. 583, 295 A.2d 390 (Law Div. 1972).
216 Id. at 593, 295 A.2d at 396.
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ever, the issuance of a mandamus to perform the discretionary
action-the acceptance or rejection of the nominee on the basis of
merits-would not be within the court's power. In Reid Development
Corp. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 2 17 the supreme court espoused the reach of mandamus: "When there is an omission to do
what the law clearly and unmistakably directs as an absolute duty,
mandamus is an appropriate remedy."218 In addition, the court
could further order the senator to articulate the grounds of the rejection. When an individual senator rejects a nominee on a basis unrelated to that nominees qualifications for the position, a clear abuse of
discretion is evident. The courts are empowered to correct such
abuses of discretion. Again, the Reid court provides guidance.
"Where there has been an abuse of discretion, the action may be
vacated and fulfillment directed of what the law deems an imperative
obligation." 2 19 Thus, when faced with either inaction on the part of
the entire Senate or rejection by an individual senator on a basis
unrelated to the candidate's qualifications, the courts can and should
issue a mandamus.
Legislative Solutions
Within the legislative branch there is a possible remedy to
Senatorial Courtesy by way of Senate rule changes. 220 The purpose
218

10 N.J. 229, 89 A.2d 667 (1952).
Id. at 237, 89 A.2d at 671.

219

Id.

217

220 The legislative rules, regarding the appointment process, read:
XX-

NOMINATIONS

148. When nominations shall be made by the Governor to the Senate, they
shall, unless otherwise ordered by the Senate, be referred to the Judiciary Committee.
149. The report of the Judiciary Committee concerning any such nomination
shall be in writing and shall show whether the same as reported with a recommendation for confirmation or rejection, or without any recommendation, and how each
member signing the report voted upon the nomination.
150. The final question to be placed before the Senate in public session upon
every nomination shall be, "'Will the Senate advise and consent to this nomination
(or these nominations, if more than one is to be voted on by a single roll call)?"
which question shall not be put on the same day on which the nomination is received, nor on the day on which it may be reported by the Committee, unless the
Senate shall so resolve by vote three-fourths of all its members; provided, however,
that an affirmative vote of at least a majority of all the Senators shall be necessary to
advise and consent to any and all nominations. The President may call for a single
roll call on more than one nomination unless a member shall request a separate roll
call on a particular nomination or nominations. The names of the Senators voting for
and against the nomination and the report, if any, of the Senate Judiciary Committee with respect thereto, shall be entered on the Journal of the Senate. Notwithstanding any of the provisions of this rule, consideration of the final question as
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of these changes would be to adopt rules which could lead to an
eventual breakdown of Senatorial Courtesy. 2 2 ' The most desirable
goal is to bring about a "procedure of open review." 2 2 2 Such a procedure would in effect make each individual senator subject to public
knowledge as to his criticisms and actions on each individual nomination. A sixty-day limit on the time that a nomination could remain in
the Judiciary Committee would be the first step towards such a
change. This proposed rule change was put forth in the past and met
with little success. 223 The attractiveness of such a rule change is that
it would get the nomination on the Senate floor and subject to public
consideration within a certain period of time.2 2 4 This would serve to
make the Senate a more "responsible reviewing body." 2 2 5 Another
to whether the Senate will advise and consent to the nomination of any person for
the office of Attorney General or Secretary of State, may be considered and acted
upon by the Senate on the same day on which such nomination is received from the
Governor.
151. All information or remarks concerning the character or qualifications of
any person nominated by the Governor to office which are brought to the attention
of the Judiciary Committee during its consideration of the nomination shall not be
made public; provided, however, that any nominee upon written request shall be
granted a hearing by the Judiciary Committee in public or private session, at the
discretion of the committee which shall then advise the nominee of any objections
raised to his confirmation and shall afford him an opportunity to respond thereto, in
public or private.
152. a. All nominations approved by the Senate or otherwise definitely acted
on shall, from day to day as such proceedings may occur, be transmitted by the
Secretary to the Governor, with the determination of the Senate thereon and the
number of Senators voting for and against such nomination; but except for the
names of the Senators voting for and against confirmation of such nominee and the
report, if any, of the Judiciary Committee, no further extract from the executive
journal shall be furnished, published or otherwise communicated, except by special
order of the Senate.
b. All nominations neither confirmed nor rejected during an annual session of the Senate shall not be acted upon in a subsequent annual session without
being again made to the Senate by the Governor.
[1978] MANUAL OF THE LEGISLATURE OF NEW JERSEY 333-35.
221 Wiley, supra note 2, at 71. There is a realization on the part of all those opposed to

Senatorial Courtesy that it will not end with any immediacy. Those who see the rule as a
mainstay of their own ability in effecting personal influence on the appointment process will not
easily give it up.
222 Id.
223 See notes 125-29 supra and accompanying text. The "sixty day rule" could be one of the
most effective tools in harnessing Senatorial Courtesy. In 1966 and 1976, rule changes were put
forth which included the sixty day rule. The proponents of the rule changes hoped to make the
individual Senators more responsible to their constituents.
224 Wiley, supra note 2, at 71.
22s We cannot allow ourselves to continue to be awed by the many complexities in the governmental structure, especially whenever tolerance for such traditions as Senatorial Courtesy
permits abuse within the structure which destroys the very basis for its existence. That basis is a
responsive government which acknowledges and reacts to the demands of the people. While we
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necessary change would be a Senate rule which insures the general
accessibility of all information and remarks concerning the nominee
which were exchanged in the deliberations of the Senate Judiciary
Committee. The entire process of confirmation or rejection would
then be exposed to public review and scrutiny. Unfortunately, the
immediate effect of these legislative changes would not be to end the
use of Senatorial Courtesy. However, such changes will expedite the
process of judicial confirmation or rejection in the Senate, as well as
focus more public attention on the selection process generally. These
changes are important, however, for a more subtle reason. The ultimate check on an elected official is, in fact, the election ballot. Informing the senator's constituents -those harmed by the case
backlogs-of the senator's abuse of power may trigger a different corrective device. If the informed electorate is aggrieved by these
abuses, the senator, after the next election, may no longer be in a
position to abuse his office.
The Senate must be made more aware of the caliber of the
nominee. Getting the selections on the Senate floor as quickly as possible for open debate can only benefit the state in the future. First,
the selection process itself will become more open and efficient. Second, those nominees eventually selected will be of a higher caliber,
since individual qualifications can be compared on the Senate floor.
Many steps have been taken to improve judicial selection through
screening committees and the like. 226 Such procedures are effective
devices to improve the quality of the nominees and must be continued. However, these are not the sole solutions.
CONCLUSION

Senatorial Courtesy is a "vice." It is a veto power which breeds
compromise and bargain. Thus, it creates an unintentional equality
between a single senator and the state's chief executive. 22 7 The
people of New Jersey have the right to demand that every member of
the senate vote according to his own "conscience-not the conscience
28
of another." 2
Michael J. Feehan

cannot be so naive as to think that all abuses can be cured, we can no longer tolerate the open
and widespread abuse of our constitutionally created process of judicial selection.
226 For a discussion of plans for judicial selection, see note 119 supra.
227 Wiley, supra note 2, at 71.
228 Parsekian Moves to Completely Abolish 'Senatorial Courtesy,' 89 N.J.L.J. 389 (1966).

